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REVERSE MORTGAGE: OVERVIEW, POTENTIAL FOR PORTUGAL AND IMPACT OF COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the Reverse Mortgage (RM) market development. It discusses potential 
market failures, such as adverse selection, and possible solutions. It is debated whether RM would 
thrive in Portugal by establishing a parallelism with Spain, and performing an empirical evaluation 
of borrowers’ potential demand, via survey. The COVID-19 impact in the U.S. is studied, focusing 
on the aggregate demand drivers (interest rates, economic state, and disbursed amount). The results 
suggest that the RM market is resilient, flexible, and a good solution to liquidity issues. It does not 
seem, however, to be viable in most countries due to regulatory matters and borrowers’ financial 
illiteracy. 
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1. OVERVIEW (HISTORY) 
 World population is aging, which directly reflects on how different countries deal with the 
foreseeable collapse of pension systems. Most of the government pensions, like the Social Security 
of the U.S. are characterized as a defined benefit system, which guarantees a retirement benefit 
dependent on the contributions done during the citizens’ work life work life rather than on 
investment returns. With the decline of public pension systems, many employer-sponsored 
retirement plans shifted from a defined benefit to a defined contribution system, raising the 
uncertainty of the pension income due to investment risk, which is arguably an incentive for the 
citizens to become homeowners, ensuring this way, a place to live. Accordingly, different studies 
conclude that Reverse Mortgages (RM) are welfare-enhancing for elderly American homeowners 
(Venti & Wise, 1991; Merrill, Finkel, & Kutty, 1994; Mayer & Simons, 1994).  
 The idea of a contract providing a loan with the home’s equity as collateral, emerged in 
1961 as an act of kindness to a widow. Henceforth, this concept generated curiosity, becoming an 
official state-provided financial tool in 1988, when Pres. Ronald Reagan signed the RM bill into 
law approving the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance of the so-called Home Equity 
Conversion Mortgage (HECM). Since then, the RM contract has developed (e.g., an additional 
offer of differentiated products, and regulation improvement), reaching the current point of a safe 
financial tool both for lenders and borrowers.  
The U.S. was the first country to recognize and provide state-runed RM, being the oldest 
and still largest market in the world. Moreover, it is where there are less informational constraints, 
allowing a stronger analysis. Therefore, the following RM assessment will be focused mostly on 
the U.S. market, more specifically, the one provided by FHA: HECM.  
 RM can be seen as a supplement to either private or public pension income; an insurance 
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against financial shocks coming, for instance, from health risk; and a tool to achieve a welfare-
maximizing smooth consumption curve. But what are indeed RM and how do they function?  
 RM are a type of loan which allows homeowners to convert some of their home’s equity 
into cash, without moving or selling their homes. This financial instrument is targeted to elders 
who have already reached the retirement age (Americans must be at least 62 years old); own their 
home outright or have a very low outstanding mortgage debt; and have the house which will serve 
as collateral, registered as primary residence. This product is mainly beneficial to “house rich, cash 
poor” individuals who found themselves in a liquidity need situation, having a lot of borrowing 
constraints due to their lack of certain, significant income flow. Thus, one can infer that RM are 
more valuable to the more elderly and consequently to women due to their higher life expectancy.  
 RM are nonrecourse loans meaning debtors are not liable to repay more than the house 
value – they must repay just the minimum amount between the loan balance and the house price.  
 Since the outstanding loan balance is only repaid once at termination, the usual assessment 
of whether borrowers can pay debts is not required. The single asset worth considering is the house 
value pledged as collateral, which may be a concern due to the house market volatility and its risks 
thus, RM is a provider for insurance against a decline in housing prices, albeit at a cost, because 
the terms established in the beginning of the contract relative to the size of the loan are constant. 
1.1. Estimation of the RM loan size:  
 The Principal Limit, defined as the maximum amount which an RM borrower can receive 
from the loan, is a function of the Principal Limit Factor (dependent on the age of the youngest 
borrower (positive relation), and the expected average mortgage interest rate (negative relation)) 
and the Maximum Claim Amount (MCA – higher value between the house market price and the 
limit established by the FHA which, for contracts signed since January 1st, 2020 is $765,600).  
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 The Principal Limit is then discounted by the accounted Loan Costs which encompasses a 
panoply of different costs according to the National Reserve Mortgage Lenders Association: 
• Origination Fee: lender’s operating expenses. Capped at $6,000 [max ($2,500; 2% of the 
first $200,000 of the house’s value + 1% of the remaining over the $200,000)]. 
• Mortgage Insurance Premium (MIP): insurance provided by FHA to protect both the 
lender and the borrower in case one of them fails to meet their obligations: FHA assumes 
responsibilities for the loan if the lender is unable to meet obligations; and cover the possible losses 
for the borrower in the house sale if the amount obtained is not enough to pay back the outstanding 
debt (agreeing with the nonrecourse feature of RM). The cost structure encompasses: an upfront 
fee, a flat 2% premium of the MCA; and an ongoing fee, with a current rate at 0.5% of the 
outstanding loan balance, however it is not paid directly by the borrower, but instead accrued 
annually and paid when the loan is due, along with all the other debt. 
• Appraisal Fee: Evaluate the home’s market value, checking if all regulation is met. 
Averaging $450 for the first examination and $125 for the second one, if applicable. 
• Closing Costs: Credit report fee (~$20 - $50); Flood certification fee (~$20); Settlement 
fee (~$150 to $800); Document preparation fee (~$75 to $150); Recording fee (~$50 - $500); 
Courier fee (< $50); Title insurance; Pest Inspection (< $100); and Survey (< $250). 
• Servicing Fee & Set-Aside: the so-called Life Expectancy Set-Aside (LESA) covers the 
lender’s administrative fees, and the borrower’s expenses required over the life of the loan 
(property taxes and insurance), in the case of being considered unable to pay them, if the credit 
score is below a determined threshold. This fee can be included into the interest rate of the loan, 
or it can be defined as a fixed monthly amount. In the last case, a portion of the loan proceeds will 
be set-aside (not collected) to pay this fee at termination. This set-aside amount is calculated 
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according to the borrower’s age and life-expectancy, considering the monthly fee is capped at $35.  
• Interest: charged only over the withdrawals. As the RM has no payments until the due 
date, the interest is accrued, at a compounded rate, until the repayment time comes. The rate 
applied can be fixed or variable. The latter is tied to an index, 30-day LIBOR (London Interbank 
Offered Rate) or 1-year CMT (Constant Maturity Treasury) and its margin is fixed at the beginning 
of the loan accordingly to the yield requirements in financial markets. 
1.2. Disbursement Options: 
 In 2013, due to the relatively high loan defaults of borrowers making huge withdrawals of 
funds in the first year, it was imposed a limit on what could be disbursed on the first 12 months of 
the contract: either 60% of the Principal Limit or 10% plus mandatory obligations. In RM, the 
funds can be withdrawn in several ways to accommodate the different needs of each borrower: 
• Single-disbursement lump-sum: only payment plan available for fixed rate mortgages 
consisting in a single payment at the closing of the contract. Capped at the disbursement limit. 
• Line of Credit: unscheduled disbursements, when and in the wanted amount until the loan 
line runs out. This plan has a unique advantage of rising over time by the interest rate. 
• Tenure (“life” annuity): constant monthly payments until termination. This plan is the 
perfect complement to the pension income and can also be argued as being more beneficial to 
women due to their higher life expectancy. Additionally, the borrower can choose a modified 
tenure, consisting in a combination of a credit line and scheduled monthly disbursements. 
• Term (“fixed period” annuity): constant monthly payments for a determined period. 
Additionally, there is the choice of a modified term, a combination of line of credit and term plan. 
1.3. Maturity Events & Payment of the Outstanding Loan Balance: 
 According to the regulation, RM is due when the last borrower leaves the home, with death 
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of the last living borrower (decisions pass to heirs); change of the primary residence (not living in 
the pledged house for more than 1 year – e.g., moving to a nursing home); or sale of the house. 
 At contract termination, the outstanding loan balance must be repaid, either by the borrower 
or by his/her heirs, having three options: settle the mortgage with their own funds, keeping the 
house; sell the house and use the proceeds to settle; or relinquish the house to the bank. 
1.4. Types of Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM): 
 HECM is the FHA provided loan, allowing elders to access part of their home’s equity to 
spend on whatever they need. The HECM Traditional is the one usually described as RM. 
 Besides this usual option, there is also the HECM for Purchase launched in 2009, allowing 
elders to purchase a new, more adequate home. The borrower must do an initial investment with 
their own funds (a down payment of about 30% to 50% of the home’s purchase price). 
 Lastly, also introduced in 2009, came the HECM for Refinance, allowing the borrower to 
refinance the previously issued HECM. The advantage of acquiring this loan depends on the 
potential change of interest rates; Principal Limit Factors; and/or appraised home’s value. 
1.5. Reverse Mortgages Over the World: 
 Due to the escalating issue of aging population, several international policy makers are 
trying to come up with innovative ways of approaching pension systems, to accommodate both 
the question of demand for long-term investment options and housing shortages (Sing & Stewart, 
2018). Following this, the RM’s markets in different cultures are characterized: 
• United Kingdom: Since the introduction of RM in the UK, a variety of ups and downs in 
this market was witnessed, worsen by the 1980s and 1990s mis-selling scandals, when there was 
an “earlier mini-boom in the UK equity release”, practicing high costs and not implementing the 
nonrecourse feature – borrowers usually ended up passing debt to heirs (Jenkins, 2017). 
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 Research carried out by Royal London shows that 89% of Britons aged 45 to 64 (“the 
children”), want their parents to spend their money in retirement, and only 45% of those aged 65 
to 85 (“the parents”) think they would leave cash as heritage. This, allied with a raise of health 
expenses, made elder Britons more prone to the “equity release market” – UK’s RM. 
 From 2015 onward, the equity release market became even more attractive to consumers 
due to a panoply of new features. Those included higher principal limits; a lower interest rate; a 
retrench of the previously implemented protection; the option to move home and get cashback; the 
analysis of each contract by an independent financial adviser, along with a heavy regulation, 
assuring a safe market; and the entrance of recognized banks and insurance companies as lenders, 
bringing a healthy advantageous competition for consumers. (Male & Dunn, 2018). 
As a recent well-developed market in the UK, RM still have room to grow. In fact, the Q1 
2020 was the Q1 with the major number of contracts since 1991, and with a property wealth 
increase of 14% relative to the previous year (inf. provided by the Equity Release Council).  
• Australia: RM were first implemented in the 1990s based on the U.S.’s and UK’s products, 
however the legislation for lenders was only implemented in 2009 with the National Consumer 
Credit Protection Act 2009. “Since then, the exposure to RM almost doubled, even have suffered 
the impact of the global financial crisis, from $1.3 billion in March 2008 to $2.5 billion by 
December 2017.” (Knaack; Miller & Stewart, 2020). Getting an RM in Australia comes with a 
great disadvantage: the borrower is excluded from the application to the state social programs. 
• Europe: According to an industry study, 75% of the 2009 European RM market’s 
transactions took place in the UK (European Mortgage Federation, 2009) thus, one can conclude 
that the other countries have not yet developed a significant RM market. It can be verified that 
some countries have not even proceeded with the crucial legal aspects to accommodate this new 
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product, and others have the legal and regulatory framework covered but the market does not react 
as expected, the case in France, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Spain, and Hungary. The combination 
of low homeownership and low home appreciation rates with the unwillingness of Europeans to 
take loans pledging their own home, can be the major cause of the RM failure in Europe. 
• Asia: The concept of “family” plays a big role in the Asian culture, consequently, one may 
say they are prone to leave an inheritance. Attesting this reasoning, an empirical study by Yoo & 
Koo (2008), showed that, in a sample of 290 Koreans aged between 25 and 35, only 37% of the 
children would support their parents’ decision to contract an RM due, perhaps, to their economic 
situation (78% could not afford to buy their own house and 55% still live with their parents).  
 Although Hong Kong SAR has a suitable environment for the RM market with high 
property prices, an aging population, an attractive regulatory framework, and several lending 
institutions, this market did not flourish. In fact, in the beginning of this year, there were only about 
3,300 RM endorsements, in a country where approximately 1.25 M households own their home.  
 On the other side, Singapore has a huge percentage of homeowners with liquidity issues 
(around 90% homeownership rate – SDOS, 2019), due to their hybrid pension system which sets 
aside a good portion of their retirement reserves with the goal of purchasing a home (Sing & 
Stewart, 2018). One may say a good solution would be the implementation of RM however, after 
2009 the RM market was discontinued due to lack of demand. (Fong & Mitchell, 2020). 
Summing up, although some Asian countries provide borrowers the possibility of acquiring 
an RM, one may say that cultural constraints end up impeding the potential growth of this loan. 
2. MARKET FAILURES IN REVERSE MORTGAGES 
2.1. Market Failures on the Supply Side: 
• Cross-Over Risk & High Insurance Premium: Although the nonrecourse feature is 
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currently applicable in all the U.S.’s RM contracts, the housing equity falling below the 
outstanding loan balance is still considered a risk, the Cross-Over Risk. Neither the lender nor the 
borrower must be concerned with this possibility due to the borrower’s obligation of getting an 
FHA insurance. The risk definition shows its dependence on other more usual ones: interest rate 
risk – due to its direct relation with the outstanding loan debt; longevity risk (risk of a person 
outliving their retirement savings) – due to the positive relation of the outstanding debt with time 
in the cases where the borrower chooses periodic payments rather than a lump-sum withdrawal; 
and property valuation and maintenance risk – directly affecting the property’s market price.  
 As the Cross-Over Risk constitutes a serious problem for RM insurers, Wang, Huang, and 
Miao designed a crossover bond, a possible solution to offset this issue. Theoretically, the 
insurance premium structure must equal the structure of the expected claim losses, meaning the 
PV of all the expected losses must equal to the PV of the premium charges. The problem arises 
when the actual losses out stand the expected ones, making the insurer incur in an unexpected loss. 
The crossover bond created is like a Treasury bond, paying a coupon at each payment date plus 
the principal at maturity, however, the coupon component is contemporaneously dependent on the 
relative value of the actual versus the expected loss. The coupon rate paid to a crossover bond 
investor is higher than the one paid to a treasury bond investor when the actual losses incurred by 
the insurer do not reach the expected level, and vice-versa (Wang, Huang & Miao, 2011). The 
creation of a crossover bond transfers the unexpected loss to the bond investors eliminating the 
cross-over risk from the RM insurer which can be said to increase the desire to supply this product.  
 Associated with this failure, the imperfection of the actuarial models used to calculate the 
insurance premium is also a great dilemma for the RM supply side. The high value provided by 
the miscalculation of this premium is carried by the borrower, leading most of them to give up on 
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getting this type of loans due to the implicit high costs. 
• Adverse Selection & Lack of Risk Pooling Mechanisms for Lenders: The concept of 
adverse selection appears when there is asymmetrical information among parties before the 
signature of a contract, which may lead to an inadequate selection of the available options. In RM, 
the borrowers are the ones who usually have more potentially harmful information for others. 
 The life expectancy, for example, may affect both the lender and the borrower if seen from 
different perspectives. On one hand, borrowers with a higher expected life (longevity risk), pay 
less interest over the outstanding loan either by enjoying their houses for an extended period 
without paying the interest corresponding to that increased time, being outside the lender’s rights 
to evict them (Davidoff & Welke, 2004); or by making a higher lump-sum withdrawal calculated 
according to the life expectancy (paying less accrued interest). On the other hand, it can be 
observed that RM are often signed for medical emergencies, which is usually sign of a reduced 
life expectancy, leading to a higher factor for the calculation of the Initial Principal Limit (IPL). 
 To tackle this issue, the borrower must go through a tough assessment covering his credit 
score, criminal record, house preservation, health condition, among other subjects that may be a 
potential source of asymmetric information from the borrower to the lender. Furthermore, the 
lenders must pass a panoply of criteria to be approved as an FHA certified lender.   
 The borrowers’ problems related to adverse selection are challenged by the consumer 
protection association. However, the asymmetric information problem is aggravated for lenders 
due to lack of risk pooling mechanisms, which can reduce the economic viability for suppliers. 
• Moral Hazard & Costly Regulation: One may say that the moral hazard concept is 
intrinsically linked with the morality one, due to the probability of one party breaching the terms 
of the contract when there is no direct consequence for him/her but there is a cost to the other one. 
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On one hand, moral hazard may be defined as the risk of one party going against the contract 
principles after the contract signature, in a hopeless attempt to achieve more profits than initially 
predicted. On the other hand, moral hazard may be in place, when one party enters the contract not 
being completely faithful to the actual situation (e.g., true value of their assets or credit capacity).  
In the specific case of RM, the homeowners’ incentive to preserve their homes and pay the 
property taxes decreases over time. Due to the nonrecourse feature of RM, the lack of maintenance 
would be borne by the insurer. Additionally, the heirs have no incentive to incur in repair costs to 
maximize the sale’s price because they will not carry out the debt, which may increase corruption 
in the private housing sales market. In case of moral hazard behavior by the borrower’s side, the 
lender commonly foreclosures the contract even bearing the high transaction costs (Caplin, 2002). 
The solution found to partially combat this issue is to require a credit assessment of the borrower, 
which if below a determined threshold, the borrower should make a LESA. However, one may say 
that the cost of implementing the necessary regulations to tackle the moral hazard issue is in itself 
a huge market barrier for the application of RM in some countries.   
• Lack of Competition: In the U.S., the RM market is already well-developed and regulated. 
According to Ibis World, in March 2020, the market size was accounted in 7 billion dollars and 
there were 978 businesses originating, broking and servicing this loan. Outside U.S., RM is still 
not well-developed nor regulated, aspects which do not attract lenders into the market, leading to 
a lack of competition increasing the difficulty for this industry to attain a consistent growing path. 
2.2. Market Failures on the Demand Side: 
• Opportunity Costs: Contracting an RM can bring some disadvantages from the 
borrower’s point of view, mainly when thinking about the potential benefits lost (opportunity 
costs). When the borrower makes the advanced decision of getting an RM, would most likely start 
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to dis-save earlier, resulting in a sizable loss in his saving account. One of the main reasons leading 
elders into getting an RM, is the high health expenses. However, one good solution usually 
embraced by seniors to deal with this expense, is selling their house and using the gathered funds 
to pay for a nursing home, reaching a financial stable life after the move. In most countries where 
RM were already implemented, their acquirement constitutes a limiting factor for the eligibility 
for social insurance programs, like the state pension income, known as the Social Insurance Risk.  
• Elderly Care: RM can be seen as a health care insurance tool due to its potential source 
for funds aimed for that kind of expenses. However, it is a flawed one because it does not take into 
account the probable need of the borrower to move into a nursing home (>50% in the U.S.) (Hurd, 
Michaud & Rohwedder, 2013), problem known as Elderly Care Risk. One of the circumstances 
for contract termination is the absence of the last living borrower from the pledge house for 1 year, 
which happens with the move to an elderly care facility, exactly when health expenses raise.  
• Regulatory Uncertainty, Financial Illiteracy & Low Demand: Most of the common 
citizens, mainly the ones at retirement age, do not have the sufficient financial knowledge to 
perfectly understand RM, making them more susceptible to frauds. The grey spots in the regulation 
associated with this lack of financial literacy helped the conmen which did not leave a good 
reputation for RMs, worsened by the well-publicized cases of mis-selling and fraud (1990s).
 The lack of regulatory clarity also keeps some potential borrowers away, not giving them 
enough security to compromise to a financial product such as this one. “RM market is stuck in a 
vicious cycle of low demand, making it very hard to determine reliable actuarial estimates, in other 
words, the lack of data coming from the minimal demand, increases the borrowing costs, which in 
turn, keep the demand low” (Davidoff & Welke, 2004). To tackle this issue, some countries 
implemented the requirement of the borrower getting counselling from an independent party. The 
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U.S. pioneered in 1998, when it was determined that potential RM’s customers had to be 
counselled by a HUD-approved third party before signing the contract.   
• Cultural Factors: Culture is one of the most significant barriers which can hamper this 
financial deal. The values and beliefs related with family have an important impact on the decision 
of whether to acquire an RM. It can be verified that the older and more conservative cultures are, 
with higher standards for family values, the less RM products are well-received (e.g., Asian 
countries and Spain), when compared with more dynamic and success driven cultures (e.g., the 
U.S. and the UK). The thought of harming the future generation (no inheritance) is still a big 
concern and deciding factor to consider in most European countries when talking about RM. 
 The citizens’ perspective of the government policies and actions is also a factor influencing 
the willingness to acquire an RM. For instance, the trust instilled on the population about the 
government, private financial institutions, and state regulatory bodies was found to be a great 
determinant on how potential borrowers would react to this kind of market offer (conclusion taken 
from the evaluation of the survey to a portion of the Portuguese population, latter cited). 
3. PROS AND CONS OF REVERSE MORTGAGE ACROSS CULTURES 
 From the Borrower’s Point of View, one may say there are more factors in favor of getting 
an RM than against it. However, even being only a few cons, some of them can be deal breakers.  
 The requirement that the youngest couple’s member must be at least 62 years old, hamper 
the ones with a great age gap to apply for this loan as a couple. Even though passing the ownership 
of the pledged house to the older homeowner is an option, the youngest partner is not being 
included in the contract, which may cause future problems. Additionally, the huge costs associated 
with this type of loan may dissuade some potential customers, even though they may be included 
in the loan balance. Moreover, one must always consider the citizens with a desire to leave the 
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house as an inheritance, and if they are not capable of paying the outstanding debt at termination 
using other resources, they would have to sell the house to do so. Likewise, if, in life, the borrower 
is not able to keep up with the property taxes and insurance, or to remain in the pledged house due 
to long-term care needs, the loan is due and there is a huge possibility of losing the home.  
 Even though all these factors negatively impact the borrower’s decision to get an RM, there 
are some others that push the decision in the opposite way. The source for a regular non-taxable 
cash inflow is what attracts more RM customers, which allied with the impossibility of either the 
debtor or their heirs contracting a huge debt due to its nonrecourse feature, comes as a great 
advantage when compared with common loans (difficult to attain for elders in retirement age). The 
additional funds are seen not only as a source of life-quality improvement, but also to escape from 
unexpected expenses, brought by financial shocks (e.g., disease, catastrophe, or property damage). 
 The pension systems are collapsing all over the world, and the access to the house’s equity 
comes as an advantage to the elders’ suppressing liquidity needs. Accordingly, a series of studies 
found RM to boost welfare both for Americans and citizens of developing countries where high 
homeownership rates and limited pension coverage systems are present. Although the literature 
does not show a clear evidence that RM reduce poverty, it can be beneficial for both low- and 
high-income households, depending on the environment (more beneficial for low-income citizens 
in developing countries and for high-income households in advanced economies). (Ong, 2008) 
 From the Lender’s Point of View, although there are some disadvantages and risks taken 
when the regulation is not completely clear, the RM non-interest income is substantial, 
compensating the disadvantages most of the times. Non-interest income is defined as the income 
coming mainly from mandatory fees the borrower must pay to the lender when acquiring, in this 
case, an RM. Additionally, interest rates applied to RM are substantially higher than the ones 
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applied to common loans and compounded. Before the creation of RM, the group of citizens in the 
retirement age were not eligible to the common loans, therefore, a lender’s entrance in this market, 
allow to access all age groups of potential borrowers, translating obviously in extra revenues.  
 The greatest challenges for lenders in the RM market occur in developing countries and/or 
in recent markets. The difficult access to information in developing countries makes it tougher to 
assess and price longevity risk, and the existing solution for this problem in advanced economies, 
insurance, is not well applicable due to their low development. Due to this lack of regulation and 
sense of security for lenders in developing countries, like Singapore and South Africa and although 
the RM were initially implemented in these countries, later, the creditors left the market, having 
considered RM economically unviable. (Knaack, Miller & Stewart, 2020) 
 As there are more potential development benefits for each country applying this product 
than costs, from the Government’s Point of View, it can be seen as a good bet. The cons for the 
government itself if it decides to implement this mortgage, are all associated with the costs incurred 
in developing the appropriated regulation, which can be expensive, as the one combating the Moral 
Hazard issue. The creation of specialized state entities to control and supervise the RM market are 
also found to be essential for a good market performance (as in U.S. and UK), coming with costs. 
 Policy makers are trying to solve the pension systems’ deterioration impact of retirement 
income: in advanced economies, the risk of inadequate pensions has increased with the shift from 
a defined benefit to a defined contribution system; in countries emerging now, the increased 
urbanization and the family’s heritage importance, has damaged the elders’ financial support. The 
elders of developing countries face the additional risk of being the transitional generation between 
a traditional family support system and a modern financial support system including both public 
and private pension schemes, SS, and long-term health care insurance solutions. Overall, the 
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introduction of RM would take some of the pressure felt on the state pension systems both in 
advanced and developing countries using the housing equity available, which also comes as a good 
solution to deal with the housing shortages in many countries, rotating this equity. 
4. VIABILITY OF REVERSE MORTGAGE IN PORTUGAL – AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 To evaluate the viability of RM in the Portuguese market, it would be beneficial to see the 
reaction in a country with a similar culture and economy, hence Spanish market will be analyzed.  
 Spanish RM is called Hipoteca Inversa and although being available since 2002, it only 
began to be commercialized in 2005, and more adequately regulated in 2007 with the creation of 
state financial institutions to clarify both lenders and potential borrowers. However, currently, 
there is only one lender providing this type of mortgage in the Spanish market, ironically, a 
Portuguese bank – BNI Europa. This financial product in Spain has as target group, citizens with 
fewer assets and low income, over 65 years old or requiring long-term care (extra condition when 
compared with the U.S.). Additionally, the loan only comes due in case of death of the last living 
borrower, not entailing the issue of elder care risk, because the borrower can simply move to a 
nursing home, without having to pay off the outstanding debt. However, there is another risk that 
is not covered for the borrower in Spain contrarily to what happens in the U.S. – longevity risk – 
if the borrower lives more than expected, he/she will stop receiving the complementary income. 
 Portugal is like Spain in a panoply of characteristics: low appreciation of the respective 
house markets, mainly after the 2008 financial crisis; socioeconomic and cultural factors; and aged 
population with high homeownership rates at retirement. All these factors combined with 
Portuguese elders being the ones provided with the lowest pensions in all Europe, should translate 
in a good environment to RM implementation.  
 However, in Spain, this product is not thriving at all. In 2018, for instance, there were only 
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45 RM endorsements. One may point out some possible causes for this failure in Spain: the fact 
that the contract only comes due with the death of the last living borrower gives fewer opportunities 
for the lenders to get the debt paid, and although the interest is higher than in ordinary loans (5%), 
the waiting associated with longevity, interest, and house market risks, makes it unappealing to 
lenders; one of the settlement options for heirs is to deliver the house to the lender, however, banks 
are already piled up with real estate in their balance sheets, which also diminishes the willingness 
to supply this product; the lack of supply takes on an obvious consequence, the ignorance of 
Spanish citizens regarding this product (an inquiry made to Spanish inhabitants in 2019, showed 
that only 12% of homeowners above the age of 65 knew about RM). 
 Theoretically, Portugal has almost perfect conditions to prosper in this market, benefiting 
even from the “errors” of Spain entering the market with a steeper learning curve, providing a 
potential improvement in the life of the ones in retirement, since this country is among the ones 
with the worst expectations about the evolution of life quality in retirement age. For most 
Portuguese people, it is certain that pension income is insufficient to at least maintain the quality 
of life previously enjoyed. Moreover, the Portuguese population foresees continue working after 
retirement to acquire an extra income. All these factors contribute to a good prospective of the 
possible RM market. However, there are circumstances making the regulators stand back, as the 
cultural tendency to support their children more than in other European countries, mostly due to 
the struggle young generations face with employment  
4.1. Survey Analysis – an Empirical Approach: 
 To better evaluate the potential willingness of Portuguese citizens to acquire an RM in a 
foreseeable future, a survey was conducted to a random group of Portuguese people above the age 
of 50 [APPENDIX 1], reaching a viable number of 153 observations. The sample attained is 
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considered to be suitably distributed in terms of education (half has a superior education), a bit 
skewed in terms of age (around 71% is aged less than 60 years old) and in terms of savings rate 
(about 71% puts aside up until 20% of their income). The age skewness is considered not to 
negatively influence the results’ viability because, after the age of 50, there is only a small 
occurrence probability of drastic events changing people’s ideas, beliefs or living conditions. 
To evaluate the results’ viability, one should look upon the margin of error (e) which is 
determined by the following equality, applicable for large populations: 𝑛 =
𝑧2∗𝑝∗(1−𝑝)
𝑒2
 , where the 
n determines the size of the sample (in this case 153), z is the z-score correspondent to the 
confidence level (p) of the normal distribution (used due to the LLN). The confidence level (p) is 
the percentage revealing how confident the researcher is that the entire target group would select 
an answer within the confidence interval and should be chosen according to three important 
factors: the sample size, the frequency of response and the population size. A 90% confidence 
level was chosen, due to the sample size not being big enough to eliminate some tendencies and 
able to be fully representative of the entire population in some levels like the Age and Savings rate. 
Therefore, there is a margin of error of 3.1%, which is acceptable, meaning the results reached 
with the sample only differ in around 3 percentage points from the real population. 
 In the survey applied, the following personal characteristics were described: educational 
level; gender; age; predictability of being a debtor at retirement age, with the pledge asset being 
the primary house; having a foreseeable low pension income forbidding the same life quality as 
before; savings rate relative to income; and homeownership. From all of these, the only factor that 
proved to have an obvious impact on whether the individual would contract an RM, is the 
possession of outstanding debt at retirement age: 58% of debtholders said they would contract an 
RM if available, however only 42% of the ones free of debt would do the same. [APPENDIX 2]. 
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Contrary to what one may have thought, even though 71% of the respondents think they would 
have a low pension income, this feature does not show an obvious impact on the decision.  
 Regarding their opinion of RM fitness for the Portuguese market, although 54% of the 
respondents would not get an RM, 31% of them still think it would be good for the country’s 
market, and considering the ones who would get it, only 13% think it is not a good deal for the 
overall population. Thus, there are more citizens thinking the product would be beneficial for the 
overall economy however, not all of them would contract one. What could be the reasons? 
 This survey covered the reasons why citizens would or would not incur in an RM 
[APPENDIX 3]. The causes leading for a positive response are: 61% of respondents would use the 
extra income as a complement for the pension income; 45% of debtholders would use the funds to 
pay the outstanding debt, and only 34% of the overall would use the funds to get rid of the debt; 
only 28% would spend the money in travels; and 66% would spend the extra capital to pay for 
health/caring expenses. When asked what other reasons would make them acquire an RM, some 
have said would use the funds to invest, help their heirs (which fits with the theory aforementioned 
that Portugal is a country particularly worried about the next generation), improve their life quality 
(properly related with the fact that Portugal is one of the countries in the world where entering the 
retirement age is a synonym of entering into a worse life), and use the funds for a rainy day. 
There are different possible reasons making individuals not willing to get into an RM: 82% 
of the respondents express the desire of leaving the house to the heirs without future concerns; 
only 52% would not enter in one because of its newness in Portugal; and 64% points out the 
wariness about potential scams. A great portion affirm not trusting either the product, or the 
Table 1. Reasons leading to a potential RM endorsement: number of answers given in 
an open question where "Yinvestment" stands for investment; "Yhelpheirs" for the 
desire of helping their children/others in the foreseeable future; "Ylifequality" for the 
desire of improving their retirement life quality; and “Yrainyday” for the possibility of 
an unexpected expense. 
21 | P a g e  
 
financial institutions providing it (e.g., banks); others simply dislike contracting debt; the concern 
about their heirs and losing the house is again pointed out; and one of the final big reasons related 
with their disinterest is considering that they have enough liquidity to live in the desired lifestyle.  
 Overall, Portuguese citizens are found to be more concerned about their heirs and possible 
essential expenses rather than about more superficial or dispensable questions such as investment 
and travelling. All in all, one may say that the application of RM would be beneficial to the 
Portuguese market if correctly applicable, considering the needs and particularities of this culture, 
combined with a good in place regulation protecting all the parties involved.  
5. IMPACT OF THE CURRENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRISIS DUE TO COVID-19 IN THE U.S. MARKET 
 The pandemic impact has been felt in most businesses, and it is considered a true socio-
economic international crisis. Although this was first seen as a health crisis, the consequent indirect 
costs were much higher than the illness and mortality direct losses (Noy et al., 2020). Meaning, 
the health and economic impact are not directly related when evaluating countries individually. In 
developing countries, even the slight health shock would harm the economy due to their weak 
resilience and intrinsic socio-economic conditions. Differently, in advanced countries, the crisis is 
triggered by the downfall of international trade and the break of the global value chain. In this 
thesis, the impact in the most developed RM market is studied (U.S.). Even though Pres. Trump 
has signed into law a set of provisions offering fast and direct economic assistance (the CARES – 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security – Act), there will be an obvious impact on RM. 
 The main RM’s impacts of COVID-19 were felt on: Interest Rates, with the biggest one-
time cut ever (0.5%) by the Fed, in March, as an attempt to avoid an even bigger crisis, seen as a 
Table 2. Reasons not to incur in a potential RM endorsement: number of answers 
given in an open question where "Nlackoftrust" stands for the expressed lack of trust 
either in banking institutions or in the product itself; “Ndislikedebt” for the simple 
dislike that certain Portuguese citizens have in contracting debt, not being 
comfortable with such a commitment; “Nenoughliquidity” for the consideration of 
having enough liquidity to live the retirement life as desired; “Nheirsconcern” for the 
unwillingness of leaving any kind of possible concern for the heirs; and “Nlosehome” 
for the apprehension of losing their home either while living in it or when it is left as 
inheritance. 
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benefit for potential and current RM borrowers as a low interest rate environment translates into 
higher loan proceeds; Loan Closings & Document Signing have suffered some alterations although 
not becoming an issue; Appraisal Activity, the pandemic brought a highly recommended social 
distancing, changing the appraisal activity to “exterior-only” and “desktop-only”; Payment, 
Foreclosures & Evictions were delayed to provide a temporary relief for all parties involved; and 
Regulatory Easement, where some requirements and verifications were relaxed (e.g. employment 
reverification delay, verbal requests over the phone, document’s delivery extra time, …).  
 The number of endorsements after March actually raised when compared to the same 
period in 2019. This can be explained by the diminished interest rates and regulatory easement felt 
in this period; the increased demand for urgent liquidity due to unexpected health expenses; the 
fast and severe decline in many retirement portfolios; the appreciation of house market values; and 
the high uncertainty felt over future taxes, due to the future need of the government to acquire 
more revenue to tap into the huge expenses made to control the ongoing crisis. 
 All in all, although the pandemic has led to several changes in the RM market, the number 
of complaints made to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) slowed down, which 
shows a huge adaptability of the market itself. One may reflect upon the possibility if a similar 
crisis, like other diseases or a natural disaster, would impact RM demand, the way COVID-19 is. 
However, the pandemic is not only a health problem, but also the source of a several socio-
economic problems, which only a global crisis could have created. Thus, only an occurrence with 
similar global consequences would build the perfect storm, impacting the RM aggregate demand, 
which would not be the case with a natural disaster, usually concentrated in one geographical area.  
5.1. A Time Series Analysis on the Impact of Covid-19 over RM in the US market:  
 Firstly, an inference on which factors better determined the path of HECM’s endorsements 
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was performed, the dependent variable, using a time-series approach with data from October 2012 
until December 2019, right before the coronavirus outbreak. [APPENDIX 4] 
The explanatory variables initially thought to be significant were interest rate; personal 
savings rate; consumer price index; homeownership rate; home price index; PPP (purchasing 
power parity) adjusted GDP; bank prime loan rate; real estate loans; total social security retirement 
insurance applications; average of the RM’s initial principal limit; average of the RM’s maximum 
claim amount; and the average fixed and variable interest rates applied in the RM’s contracts. After 
testing, correcting, and adjusting the regression for all the time series assumptions (Linearity in 
Parameters; No Perfect Collinearity; Zero Conditional Mean; Homoskedasticity; No Serial 
Correlation; and Normality), the following final inference regression was reached:  
The inverse relation between the PPP-Adjusted GDP and the number of RM endorsements 
emphasizes the theory that RM are still considered a product of last resort, more used in a troubled 
environment. Considering that the monthly contracts’ average is 4,154, and that the PPP-Adjusted 
GDP has a standard deviation of 60 points, the fact that this beta is -9.4 means that a one-point 
increase in the index will decrease the number of endorsements by 9, on average, ceteris paribus.  
 The positive relation between the IPL and the dependent variable is also converging with 
the theory behind RM demand increase with available disbursements. This variable was studied in 
dollar units having a monthly average of $175,161, so a beta of 0.0285 which means that with a 
Table 3. Determinants of RM endorsements in the U.S.: Time-series regression inferring the factors that better 
determine the RM endorsements path from October 2012 until December 2019. "gdp" being the PPP-Adjusted GDP; 
"positive" being the number of positive Covid-19 cases in U.S. (variable valuable for further analysis); 
“lbplrate_vinterestRM” being the logarithm of the interaction between the bank prime loan rate and the variable 
interest rate applied to RM’s contracts; and “ipl” being the Initial Principal Limit. 
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10,000 dollar increase of IPL, endorsements would increase by 285, on average, ceteris paribus. 
 The explanatory variable named lbplrate_vinterestRM is the logarithm of the interaction 
between the bank prime loan rate and the variable interest rate applied to RM’s contracts. This 
interaction was made due to the more significant believed joint effect. The negative relation of this 
variable with the number of endorsements is also theoretical accurate (a low interest rate 
environment increases the RM demand, similarly to the present), being the beta -1,099.5, which 
means that a percentage point decrease in both bank prime loan rate and variable interest rate 
would imply an increase of 2,000 in the monthly number of contracts, on average, ceteris paribus.   
 Secondly, a month-by-month forecast until September was performed, evaluating the 
COVID-19 crisis impact in the more accurate and contemporaneous way possible, assuming the 
events and decisions taken about one month to reflect into actual and potential borrowers’ choices.  
The following graph shows the differences 
between the real number of RM endorsements and 
the predicted value using previous data (explanatory 
variables one month lagged). As the difference for 
March and April is zero, the inference regression is 
considered accurate enough. In the graph’s negative 
zone, the forecast model applied is said to 
overestimate the true results, which have happened 
during the pandemic, just after July. After this month, the uncertainty about future expenses started 
to diminish, which combined with a higher sense of a new normality decreased RM demand. 
Although much higher than in the previous year, the demand was no longer as high as in the 
beginning of the pandemic chaos.  
Graph 1. COVID-19 possible impact in RM 
aggregate demand: month-by-month difference 
between the real number of RM endorsements and the 
predicted value using the previous month data. 
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 One may conclude, that passing through the first impact of this crisis, the citizens will have 
a decreasing willingness to contract an RM, although higher than in other periods of time before 
the pandemic, due the continued high expenses. Yet, with time passing by, the low interest and tax 
rates will foreseeably increase for their standard values, and the incentives will therefore diminish.  
6. IMPACT SOME OTHER EVENTS AT THE END OF 2020 MAY HAVE OVER RM 
6.1. Joe Biden as President – Democrats in the White House: 
 The collapse of the American Social Security trust fund is predicted for 2035, and the Biden 
administration wants to delay it, proposing a tax for wealthy Americans. Some of Biden’s 
proposals reflect a desire to protect the citizens impacted by the coronavirus outbreak, mainly the 
low-income families (e.g., expanding the Community Reinvestment Act). However, his stated goal 
of “exclusionary zoning”, allowing only single-family construction in specific areas, may go on 
the other way, due to its foreseeable positive impact on single houses’ price, increasing RM 
demand, going against its initial goal of helping the unwealthy retirees getting extra income.   
 The intent to provide in-home care options for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, is 
another proposal which seems to increase RM demand, due to the diminished probability of 
reaching one of the maturity events (moving to a nursing home). Moreover, the new administration 
is also expected to be more aggressive for CFPB, which has not grown in Trump’s administration. 
6.2. Change of LIBOR as the Reference Rate: 
 Investigations covering the period between 2003 and 2012, determined that LIBOR was 
vulnerable to manipulative actions, therefore, regulators all over the world started advising 
financial institutions to change their reference rate from LIBOR, if possible until December 2021. 
As the RM market is already making the change to Constant Maturity Treasury (CMT) since 
September, the November decline in HECM endorsements may be partially explained by this 
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transition. Although the CMT has not been used as a reference rate for HECM contracts since 
2007/2008, which may cause some backlogs in the RM endorsement process, it continues to be a 
good choice to substitute LIBOR in the short-term, as most experienced professionals, are already 
familiarized with it. For the long-term, specialists do not consider holding to CMT would make 
RM a more mainstream solution. To offer borrowers some peace of mind, a lifetime cap of 5% 
over the initial rate was implemented, along with the transition to the CMT which, in the current 
low interest rate environment is not significant but would be important if doubt about rates appear. 
6.3. Increase of the Lending Limit from $765,600 to $822,375 at 2021: 
 The increase in the lending limit is considered by most professionals a positive 
development for the RM business, predicted to raise the demand for this loan. However, the FHA 
Commissioner Dana Wade, has been criticizing this measure arguing that the subsequent increases 
of the lending limit, makes RM move away from its initial mission. 
7. CONCLUSION 
 Reverse Mortgage, for its demonstrated resilience and adaptability to different market 
circumstances, could potentially solve the elder’s liquidity issues brought by the pension systems 
collapse. However, this market seems to be viable only in economies where there is a huge 
government dedication to the product, not only in the creation of a detailed regulatory framework, 
but also in designing it appealing for lenders. One may see them as the major players, which could 
both ignore this option, or insert it in the market, publicizing it and expanding the financial literacy 
of borrowers. Supported by the survey’s results and learning from the Spanish case, one may say 
that, depending on the state’s approach to this product, it can thrive if it decides to incentivize 
lenders and cover borrowers’ risks, considering the demonstrated interest in contracting an RM, 
sometimes only disregarded by the individuals for regulatory and ignorance questions. 
27 | P a g e  
 
REFERENCES 
“4. Application/Fees/Disclosures”, Reverse Mortgage.org, accessed November 28, 2020. 
https://www.reversemortgage.org/your-roadmap/4-application-fees-disclosures/ 
“Changes and Processing Instructions (for lenders)”, FHA Connection, September 19, 2017 
“Consumer Complaint Database”, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, accessed November 
20, 2020. https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/ 
“Differences Between a Traditional Reverse Mortgage and HECM for Purchase”, Liberty 
Reverse Mortgage, accessed November 17, 2020. 
https://libertyreversemortgage.com/differences-traditional-reverse-mortgage-hecm-
purchase 
“FHA Reverse Mortgage: Convert Your Equity into Income”, FHA.com, accessed October 15, 
2020. https://www.fha.com/fha_reverse 
“HECM Snapshot”, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, accessed December 
7, 2020. 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/rmra/oe/rpts/hecmsfsnap/hecmsfsnap 
“Home Equity Conversion Mortgages for Seniors”, U.S. Department of Housing and 
Development, accessed October 15, 2020. 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/sfh/hecm/hecmhome 
“Portugueses têm das pensões mais baixas da Europa”, Observatório: luta contra a pobreza na 
cidade de Lisboa, January 22, 2008. https://observatorio-lisboa.eapn.pt/portugueses-tem-
das-pensoes-mais-baixas-da-europa/ 
28 | P a g e  
 
“Principal limit factor, PL factor”, MyHECM, accessed October 8, 2020. 
https://www.myhecm.com/reverse-mortgage-glossary/reverse-mortgage-principal-limit-
factor 
“Reverse Mortgages Providers Industry in the US”, Ibis World: Industry Research Reports, 
March 17, 2020, https://www.ibisworld.com/united-states/market-research-
reports/reverse-mortgages-providers-industry/ 
“Social Security Administration (SSA) Monthly Data for Retirement Insurance Applications 
Filed via the Internet”, Social Security, accessed December 7, 2020. document retrieved 
from: https://www.ssa.gov/open/data/retirement-insurance-online-apps-2012-
onward.html 
“The CARES Act Works for All Americans”, U.S. Department of the Treasury, accessed 
November 25, 2020. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares 
“Why does not the reverse mortgage triumph in Spain?”, News SpainHouses.net, May 20, 2019. 
https://news.spainhouses.net/2019/05/why-does-not-the-reverse-mortgage-triumph-in-
spain/ 
Baker, Scott R., Bloom, Nick and Davis, Stephen J., Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index: 
PPP-Adjusted GDP [GEPUPPP], FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, December 7, 
2020. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GEPUPPP 
Barker, Sam, “Retirement Advantage launches cashback equity release loan”, Mortgage 
Strategy, September 20, 2017. https://www.mortgagestrategy.co.uk/news/retirement-
advantage-launches-cashback-equity-release-loan/ 
29 | P a g e  
 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Bank Prime Loan Rate [MPRIME], 
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed December 7, 2020. 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MPRIME 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Real Estate Loans: Residential Real 
Estate Loans: Revolving Home Equity Loans, All Commercial Banks 
[RHEACBM027SBOG], FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed December 
7, 2020. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RHEACBM027SBOG 
Branson, M. G. (2020), “What Coronavirus Means For Reverse Mortgages (COVID)”, All 
Reverse Mortgage, Inc., April 1, 2020. https://reverse.mortgage/coronavirus 
Branson, M. G., “2020 Purchase Reverse Mortgages: Today’s Rates & Eligibility”, All Reverse 
Mortgage, Inc., November 29, 2020. https://reverse.mortgage/purchase 
Branson, M. G., “HUD’s 12 Month 60% Disbursement Limit Explained”, All Reverse Mortgage, 
Inc., November 24, 2019. https://reverse.mortgage/disbursement-limit 
Branson, M. G., “Reverse Mortgage Insurance Explained”, All Reverse Mortgage, Inc., November 
20, 2020. https://reverse.mortgage/insurance-premiums 
Branson, M. G., “Reverse Mortgage Principal Limit & Maximum Claim Explained”, All Reverse 
Mortgage, Inc., December 2, 2020. https://reverse.mortgage/principal-limit-maximum-
claims 
Branson, M. G., “Reverse Mortgage Types: Lump Sum Payout -VS- Line of Credit”, All Reverse 
Mortgage, Inc., May 30, 2019. https://reverse.mortgage/lump-sum-vs-line-of-credit 
30 | P a g e  
 
Brotman, Eric, “COVID-19 Crashed The Market, Now What Should I Do?”, Forbes, March 30, 
2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericbrotman/2020/03/30/covid-19-crashed-the-
market-now-what-should-i-do/#4f11063d7cc3 
Caplin, A. (2002). Turning assets into cash: Problems and prospects in the reverse mortgage 
industry. Innovations in Retirement Financing., Ed. Olivia S. Mitchell, Zvi Bodie, P. Brett 
Hammond and Stephen Zeldes. 
Clow, Chris, “‘High Marks’ for FHA Financial Assessment Due to Reduced Tax & Insurance 
Defaults”, Reverse Mortgage Daily, April 21, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/04/21/high-marks-for-fha-financial-assessment-
due-to-reduced-tax-insurance-defaults/ 
Clow, Chris, “3 Things Reverse Mortgage Originators Should Know About Servicing During 
Coronavirus”, Reverse Mortgage Daily, April 28, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/04/28/3-things-reverse-mortgage-originators-
should-know-about-servicing-during-coronavirus/ 
Clow, Chris, “Consumer Groups Urge HUD to Help Reverse Mortgage Borrowers During 
Pandemic”, Reverse Mortgage Daily, March 24, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/03/24/consumer-groups-urge-hud-to-help-
reverse-mortgage-borrowers-during-pandemic/ 
Clow, Chris, “Election 2020: Joe Biden, Kamala Harris and Reverse Mortgages”, Reverse 
Mortgage Daily, August 24, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/08/24/election-2020-joe-biden-kamala-harris-
and-reverse-mortgages/ 
31 | P a g e  
 
Clow, Chris, “Federal Reserve Endorses Swift Transition Away from LIBOR”, Reverse 
Mortgage Daily, November 30, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/11/30/federal-reserve-endorses-swift-transition-
away-from-libor/ 
Clow, Chris, “FHA Allows Relief for Reverse Mortgage Assignments During Coronavirus”, 
Reverse Mortgage Daily, April 14, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/04/14/fha-allows-relief-for-reverse-mortgage-
assignments-during-coronavirus/ 
Clow, Chris, “FHA Extends Relaxed Appraisal Requirements Through End of October”, Reverse 
Mortgage Daily, August 28, 2020. https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/08/28/fha-
extends-relaxed-appraisal-requirements-through-end-of-october/ 
Clow, Chris, “FHA Issues Temporary Reverse Mortgage Program Waivers Due to Pandemic”, 
Reverse Mortgage Daily, November 1, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/11/01/fha-issues-temporary-reverse-mortgage-
program-waivers-due-to-pandemic/ 
Clow, Chris, “HUD Extends Moratorium on Foreclosures, Evictions Through End of 2020”, 
Reverse Mortgage Daily, August 27, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/08/27/hud-extends-moratorium-on-foreclosures-
evictions-through-end-of-2020/ 
Clow, Chris, “HUD Secretary Will Face Major Problems in Light of Pandemic in 2021”, Reverse 
Mortgage Daily, December 3, 2020. https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/12/03/hud-
secretary-will-face-major-problems-in-light-of-pandemic-in-2021/ 
32 | P a g e  
 
Clow, Chris, “HUD: Case Binders ‘Flood’ Offices, Reverse Mortgage Volume Outpaces 2019”, 
Reverse Mortgage Daily, July 20, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/07/20/hud-case-binders-flood-offices-reverse-
mortgage-volume-outpaces-2019/ 
Clow, Chris, “January 2021 LIBOR Restriction Spurs Planning from Reverse Mortgage 
Industry”, Reverse Mortgage Daily, October 5, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/10/05/january-2021-libor-restriction-spurs-
planning-from-reverse-mortgage-industry/ 
Clow, Chris, “LIBOR Transition May Cause Issues With Loan Servicing, New Originations”, 
Reverse Mortgage Daily, June 30, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/06/30/libor-transition-may-cause-issues-with-
loan-servicing-new-originations/ 
Clow, Chris, “November Reverse Mortgage Volume Dips, HMBS Issuance Rises as Industry 
Awaits LIBOR Shift”, Reverse Mortgage Daily, December 3, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/12/03/november-reverse-mortgage-volume-dips-
hmbs-issuance-rises-as-industry-awaits-libor-shift/ 
Clow, Chris, “Reverse Mortgage Complaints to CFPB Slow During Pandemic”, Reverse 
Mortgage Daily, August 24, 2020. https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/08/24/reverse-
mortgage-complaints-to-cfpb-slow-during-pandemic/ 
Clow, Chris, “Reverse Mortgage Experts Detail Impacts of LIBOR Sunset, CMT Transition”, 
Reverse Mortgage Daily, November 11, 2020. 




Clow, Chris, “Reverse Mortgage Lending Limit Rises to Over $822k in 2021”, Reverse 
Mortgage Daily, December 2, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/12/02/reverse-mortgage-lending-limit-rises-to-
over-822k-in-2021/ 
Clow, Chris, “RMF Revives ‘MAX5’ Adjustable Rate Reverse Mortgage for CMT Transition”, 
Reverse Mortgage Daily, October 26, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/10/26/rmf-revives-max5-adjustable-rate-reverse-
mortgage-for-cmt-transition/ 
Clow, Chris, “WSJ: Biden Presidency Would Mean Greater CFPB Presence for Mortgage 
Lenders”, Reverse Mortgage Daily, October 27, 2020. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2020/10/27/wsj-biden-presidency-would-mean-greater-
cfpb-presence-for-mortgage-lenders/ 
Colette Dunn and Beatrice Male, “The rise and rise of the equity release market across the UK” 
Financial Times Adviser, May 23, 2018. 
https://www.ftadviser.com/mortgages/2018/05/23/the-rise-and-rise-of-the-equity-release-
market-across-the-uk/?page=2, accessed November 10, 2020 
Davidoff, T., & Welke, G. (2004). Selection and moral hazard in the reverse mortgage market. 
Ecker, Elizabeth, “CFPB, HUD and FHFA Launch COVID-19 Consumer Housing Website”, 
Reverse Mortgage Daily, May 13, 2020. 




European Mortgage Federation. (2009). Hypostat. Retrieved from 
https://hypo.org/ecbc/publications/hypostat/ 
Fong, J. H., Mitchell, O. S., & Koh, B. SK (2020), "Asset-Rich and Cash-Poor: Which Older 
Adults Value Reverse Mortgages?". Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers. 694. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/694 
Guerin, Jessica. “The History of the HECM: A Detailed Timeline.” The Reverse Review, October 
2012, 40-45. http://www.reversereview.com/magazine/spotlight-a-historical-timeline-of-
the-hecm-program.html 
Huang, HC., Wang, CW. & Miao, YC. Securitisation of Crossover Risk in Reverse Mortgages. 
Geneva Pap Risk Insur Issues Pract 36, 622–647 (2011). 
https://doi.org/10.1057/gpp.2011.23 
Hurd, M. D., Michaud, P.-C., & Rohwedder, S. (2013). The lifetime risk of nursing home use. In 
Discoveries in the Economics of Aging (pp. 81–109). University of Chicago Press. 
International Monetary Fund, Interest Rates, Discount Rate for United States 
[INTDSRUSM193N], FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed December 7, 
2020. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INTDSRUSM193N 
Jenkins, Patrick. “Four reasons why UK equity release mortgages will boom” Financial Times, 
July 24, 2017. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/50412c3c-7066-
11e7-93ff-99f383b09ff9 
35 | P a g e  
 
Kagan, Julia, “Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM)”, Investopedia, November 27, 2020. 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hecm.asp 
Kagan, Julia, “Reverse Mortgage Net Principal Limit”, Investopedia, September 13, 2020. 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reverse-mortgage-net-principal-limit.asp 
Kenton, Will, “Moral Hazard”, Investopedia, July 23, 2020. 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moralhazard.asp 
Knaack, P., Miller, M. J. & Stewart, F. E. (2020). Reverse Mortgages, Financial Inclusion, and 
Economic Development: Potential Benefit and Risks. (No. WPS9134). Retrieved from 
The World Bank website: https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-
reports/documentdetail/405421551711776551/housing-finance-investment-opportunities-
for-pension-funds 
Marquit, Miranda, “Get to Know the Pros and Cons of a Reverse Mortgage” the balance, June 1, 
2020. https://www.thebalance.com/reverse-mortgage-pros-and-cons-2388750 
MARTINS, Teresa Mariana Cardeira, “Reverse mortgage em Portugal: uma opção viável?” 
ISCTE, Dissertação de mestrado, April 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/4334 
Mayer, C. J., & Simons, K. V. (1994). Reverse mortgages and the liquidity of housing wealth. 
Real Estate Economics, 22(2), 235–255. 
Merrill, S. R., Finkel, M., & Kutty, N. K. (1994). Potential beneficiaries from reverse mortgage 
products for elderly homeowners: An analysis of American housing survey data. Real 
Estate Economics, 22(2), 257–299. 
36 | P a g e  
 
Michelangeli, Valentina, 2010, “Does It Pay to Get a Reverse Mortgage?,” working paper, 
Congressional Budget Office 
Nakajima, M., & Telyukova, I. A. (2017). Reverse mortgage loans: A quantitative analysis. The 
Journal of Finance, 72(2), 911–950 
Noy, I, N Doan, B Ferrarini and D Park (2020), “Measuring the Economic Risk of COVID-19”, 
Covid Economics 3. 103-118 
Ong, R. (2008). Unlocking housing equity through reverse mortgages: The case of elderly 
homeowners in Australia. European Journal of Housing Policy, 8(1), 61–79. 
S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index 
[CSUSHPINSA], FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed December 7, 2020. 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA 
Sharma, T., French, D. & McKillop, D. Risk and Equity Release Mortgages in the UK. J Real 
Estate Finan Econ (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-020-09793-2 
Sing, L. M., & Stewart, F. E. (2018). Housing finance: Investment opportunities for pension 
funds (No. 128295). Retrieved from The World Bank website: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/405421551711776551/Housing-finance-
investment-opportunities-for-pension-funds 
Singapore Department of Statistics, SDOS (2019). Households: Latest Data. Retrieved 
November 10, 2020, from https://www.singstat.gov.sg/find-data/search-by-
theme/households/households/latest-data 
37 | P a g e  
 
Spanko, Alex, “Equity in the UK: Reverse Mortgage Demand Surging Across the Pond”, Reverse 
Mortgage Daily, May 24, 2018. https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2018/05/24/equity-in-
the-uk-reverse-mortgage-demand-surging-across-the-pond/ 
Spanko, Alex, “With Similar Retirement Stresses, U.K. Poised for Reverse Mortgage ‘Boom’”, 
Reverse Mortgage Daily, July 25, 2017. 
https://reversemortgagedaily.com/2017/07/25/with-similar-retirement-stresses-u-k-
poised-for-reverse-mortgage-boom/ 
The COVID Tracking Project, accessed December 7, 2020. document retrieved from: 
https://covidtracking.com/data 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Saving Rate [PSAVERT], FRED, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, December 7, 2020. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PSAVERT 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items in 
U.S. City Average [CPIAUCSL], FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed 
December 7, 2020. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL 
U.S. Census Bureau, Homeownership Rate for the United States [RHORUSQ156N], FRED, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed December 7, 2020. 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RHORUSQ156N 
Venti, S. F., & Wise, D. A. (1991). Aging and the income value of housing wealth. Journal of 
Public Economics, 44(3), 371–397 
38 | P a g e  
 
Warshawsky, Mark J., “Retire on the House: The Possible Use of Reverse Mortgages to Enhance 
Retirement Security”, Mercatus Working Paper, 2017. 
https://doi.org/10.3905/jor.2018.5.3.010 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. 5th ed. Mason, OH: 
South-Western Cengage Learning, 2013. 
Yoo, I., & Koo, I. (2008). Do Children Support Their Parents’ Application for the Reverse 
Mortgage? A Korean Case. A Korean Case (February 2008). KDI School of Pub Policy 
















SURVEY APPLIED TO A TOTAL OF 153 PORTUGUESE CITIZENS IN SEPTEMBER, OCTOBER, AND 
NOVEMBER OF 2020 
Reverse Mortgage 
This survey is carried out in the scope of the Final Work Project for the MSc in Finance of Nova 
School of Business and Economics, with the goal of study “Reverse Mortgage”, a financial 
product still not available for Portuguese citizens. 
The survey is completely anonymous, being the answers only used for statistical purposes. Its 
filling should not take more than 5 minutes of your time. 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation! 
 
Gender:       Female        Male        Other 
 
Age:    ___ 
 
Educational Level:    4th year      6th year      9th year      12th year     




Marital Status:    Single     Married     Divorced     Widower     Nonmarital Partnership 
 
Do you own the house you live in?    Yes      No 
 
From the age of 66, do you expect to be paying any loan in which the guarantee is your 
residence?    Yes      No 
 
On average, which is the percentage of your income saved?    ____  
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Do you consider that your future pension income will be insufficient to maintain the lifestyle 
level you currently have?    Yes      No 
 
 
In video format: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vxt43e71t3M&list=PLS-tqQmfqcA-
uWLsfJtC2kOQ2NoInVHKa&index=2  
[The following description is just the video in text format]  
Imagine that when reaching retirement age (66 years), there was a financial product that would 
give you the possibility to transform about 50% of the value of the house you live in into 
liquidity (a value which could be spent as you wish) remaining as the owner and living in it. This 
liquidity can take the form of a single initial payment, monthly income, or credit line (withdraw 
money when needed). Meaning, taking a loan based on the value of your residence, not making 
any payment until the loan matures, which only happens when you die, change your address, or 
sell your home. At this point, you have the possibility, transferred to your heirs in the event of 
death, to pay off the debt. This debt is consisted by: all the withdrawals you decide to make; the 
interest over them; the home insurance; the entire amount withdrawn for the payment of loans 
with the pledge house as a guarantee; and all the fees and costs on the mortgage. To pay off the 
debt, you can do it with your funds, sell the house, paying off the debt, and keeping the 
remainder, or renounce the house to the bank. 
 
Do you consider that the mentioned product, Reverse Mortgage, would be a good bet for the 
Portuguese market? 
Not Likely 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 Most Likely 
 
Did you already know about the existence of this product?   Yes      No 
 
If given the chance, would you do a Reverse Mortgage? 
 Not Likely  Unlikely  Likely  Most Likely 
 
Which would be the reasons influencing you to purchase a Reverse Mortgage? 
 
▪ Working as a pension income complement: 
Not Likely 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 Most Likely 
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▪ Use the funds to pay the outstanding debt: 
Not Likely 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 Most Likely 
 
▪ Use the funds to travel: 
Not Likely 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 Most Likely 
 
▪ Use the funds to medical / caring expenses: 
Not Likely 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 Most Likely 
 
▪ Which other reason would you have to acquire a Reverse Mortgage? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Which would be the reasons influencing you NOT to purchase a Reverse Mortgage?  
▪ Desire to leave the housing heritage as an inheritance to the heirs at no additional cost: 
Not Likely 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 Most Likely 
 
▪ Do not feel comfortable with the fact that this is a new product in the Portuguese market: 
Not Likely 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 Most Likely 
 
▪ Concern about possible scams: 
Not Likely 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 Most Likely 
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APPENDIX 2 
KEY RESULTS OF THE SURVEY APPLIED – IMPACT OF PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS ON THE 






Graph 3.Portuguese willing to contract a RM per Educational Level Graph 2. Distribution of Educational Level in the studied sample 
Graph 3. Portuguese willing to contract an RM per Gender Graph 4. Distribution of Gender in the studied sample 









Graph 5. Portuguese willing to contract an RM by age 
Graph 6. Portuguese unwilling to contract an RM by age 










Graph 7. Distribution of savings rate of the studied sample 
Graph 8. Portuguese willing to contract an RM distributed by savings rate 








Graph 9. Portuguese unwilling to contract an RM distributed by savings rate 
Graph 10. Portuguese willing to contract an RM considering whether RM 
would be a good bet for the Portuguese market: where 1 is "Not Likely" and 6 
is "Most Likely" 














Graph 11. Portuguese unwilling to contract an RM considering whether RM 
would be a good bet for the Portuguese market: where 1 is "Not Likely" and 6 
is "Most Likely" 
Table 4. Willingness of Portuguese citizens who predict having 
outstanding debt at retirement age (0 being unwilling and 1 willing to 
contract an RM) 
Table 5. Willingness of Portuguese citizens who predict being free of 
debt at retirement age (0 being unwilling and 1 willing to contract an 
RM) 































Table 6. Willingness of Portuguese citizens who believe will have an 
insufficient pension income (0 being unwilling and 1 willing to 
contract an RM) 
Table 7. Willingness of Portuguese citizens who believe will have a 
sufficient pension income (0 being unwilling and 1 willing to contract 
an RM) 
Table 8. Homeownership rate in the studied sample (1 being the 
homeownership rate) 
Table 9. Homeownership rate of Portuguese citizens willing to 
contract a RM 
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APPENDIX 3 
KEY RESULTS OF THE SURVEY APPLIED – REASONS WHY PORTUGUESE CITIZENS WOULD OR WOULD 








Table 7. Reason why Portuguese citizens would incur in an RM: 
Working as a pension income complement [1: Not Likely; 6: Most 
Likely] 
Table 8. Reason why Portuguese citizens would incur in an RM: Use the 
funds to pay the outstanding debt [1: Not Likely; 6: Most Likely] 
Table 9. Reason why Portuguese citizens would incur in an RM: 
Debtholders using the funds to pay the outstanding debt [1: Not Likely; 
6: Most Likely] 
Table 10. Reason why Portuguese citizens would incur in an RM: Use 
the funds to travel [1: Not Likely; 6: Most Likely] 













Table 11. Reason why Portuguese citizens would incur in an RM: Use 
the funds to medical / caring expenses [1: Not Likely; 6: Most Likely] 
Table12. Reason why Portuguese citizens would NOT incur in an RM: 
Desire to leave the housing heritage as an inheritance at no additional 
cost [1: Not Likely; 6: Most Likely] 
Table13. Reason why Portuguese citizens would NOT incur in an RM: 
Do not feel comfortable with the fact this is a new product in the 
Portuguese market [1: Not Likely; 6: Most Likely] 
Table14. Reason why Portuguese citizens would NOT incur in an RM: 
Concern about possible scams [1: Not Likely; 6: Most Likely] 
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APPENDIX 4 
TIME-SERIES REGRESSION INFERRING WHICH FACTORS BETTER DETERMINE THE PATH OF REVERSE 
MORTGAGE ENDORSEMENTS ALONG TIME 
 
